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The Prague Declaration contains a list of demands, including compensation for victims. There are also calls for the establishment of a European "day of remembrance of the victims of both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes, in the same way Europe remembers the victims of the Holocaust on January 27th." The Prague Declaration further advocates for the creation of a supranational "Institute for European Memory and Conscience" as well as increased support for memorials, museums, and national historical institutes charged with investigating the crimes of communism. Finally, the Prague Declaration demands the "adjustment and overhaul of European history textbooks so that children could learn and be warned about Communism and its crimes in the same way as they have been taught to assess the Nazi crimes." cians spearheaded subsequent anti-communist activism. However, the real push to institutionalize the "double genocide" thesis came after the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008 .
European debate about the history of communism is not merely an academic skirmish about the past; it serves a wide variety of contemporary political purposes. In this essay, I explore the recent ethnographic history of this debate through three distinct moments: its roots in the late 1980s with the German Historikerstreit [historians battle]; Pierre Nora's defense of the French refusal to publish a translation of Eric Hobsbawm's The Age of Extremes in the 1990s; and the broader political context of the Prague Declaration. The current upsurge in East European commemorations for the victims of communism originates from a regional desire for victimhood status. The victims are not simply constructed discursively as the direct heirs of their own totalitarian pasts: the double genocide language produces a historical narrative wherein post-Soviet and postsocialist nations become martyrsnation-states sacrificed by the West on the red alter of Soviet imperialism. In countries such as Latvia where local populations and Nazi-allied governments participated in the systematic murder of domestic Jews, the double genocide narrative mitigates their culpability by questioning the uniqueness of the Holocaust. 8 In addition to the desire for historical exculpation, however, I argue that the current push for commemorations of the victims of communism must be viewed in the context of regional fears of a re-emergent left. In the face of growing economic instability in the Eurozone, as well as massive antiausterity protests on the peripheries of Europe, the "victims of communism" narrative may be linked to a public relations effort to link all leftist political ideals to the horrors of Stalinism. Such a rhetorical move seems all the more potent when discursively combined with the idea that there is a moral equivalence between Jewish victims of the Holocaust and East European victims of Stalinism. This third coming of the German Historikerstreit is related to the precariousness of global capitalism, and perhaps the elite desire to discredit all political ideologies that threaten the primacy of private property and free markets.
This anti-communist political project requires the production of a certain historiography of the communist past, and in this project, both Western and East European academics have perhaps unwittingly obliged, as long as the European Union provides the funds. It is ironic that the present day historiography of the communist past is so ideologically driven. With the tacit support of Brussels, there exists today in Eastern Europe an institutionally sanctioned Denkverbot [prohibition on thinking] about the everyday lived experiences of communism. In an era of supposed free speech and freedom of conscience, politicians, scholars, and activists silence other stories about the past, including any open discussion of socialism's achievements in terms of literacy, education, women's rights, and social security by focusing exclusively on the crimes of Stalin and the double genocide thesis. The Platform for Memory and Conscience in Europe is manipulating the official history-the officially commissioned histories for textbooks that are published by various European states, to state one example-and stifling public debate using methods that mimic those once deployed by the very communist regimes they are so keen to criticize and discredit.
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A Potted History of the Historian's Battle
The Historikerstreit was a major public debate between right-leaning and left-leaning historians in West Germany in the late 1980s. Public intellectuals took to the broadsheets of their country's major newspapers to exchange views on the enduring legacies of the Nazi past. The conflict was sparked by U.S. President Ronald Reagan's May 1985 visit to the Bitburg Military cemetery. Together with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Reagan spent eight minutes in a graveyard that contained the final resting places of forty-nine Waffen SS soldiers after weeks of fierce opposition in both West Germany and the United States. The following day, Bernard Weinraub of the New York Times reported: "White House aides have acknowledged that the Bitburg visit is probably the biggest fiasco of Mr. Reagan's Presidency. The visit, which was made at the insistence of Mr. Kohl, was overwhelmingly opposed by both houses of Congress, Jewish organizations, veterans' groups and others."
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The Bitburg visit, and Reagan's explicit commemoration of Nazi soldiers and Holocaust victims on the same day, set off a firestorm of controversy that precipitated the Historikerstreit.
It was the West German historian Ernst Nolte who launched the first salvo in the Historian's Battle on June 6, 1986 with an article that appeared in the conservative newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). The article, "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will" [The Past that Will Not Pass] was an abridged missive from his forthcoming book, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg [The European Civil War]. In the FAZ article, Nolte argued against a reigning paradigm that viewed the Holocaust as a unique product of German history, and asserted that Hitler's embrace of National Socialism was an understandable reaction to Russian Bolshevism. Nolte catalogued early Soviet crimes; he employed traditional right-wing terms such as "Asiatic deeds" to do so. In addition, he proposed that fascism was a counterrevolution against communism-that communism was the original totalitarianism. He wrote: "Wasn't the gulag archipelago more original than Auschwitz? Wasn't Bolshevik 'class murder' the logical and actual predecessor to National Socialist 'race murder'?"
11 According to Nolte, the Nazis only made more efficient the mechanisms for mass murder previously invented by the communists.
An immediate rebuttal came from the sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas who attacked Nolte for trying to relativize the Holocaust: "Nolte's theory offers a great advantage. He kills two birds with one stone: the Nazi crimes lose their singularity in that they are understood to be an answer to Bolshevik threats of destruction (which are apparently still present today); and Auschwitz shrinks to the dimensions of a technical innovation and is to be explained through an 'Asiatic' threat from an enemy who still stands before our gates. " 12 The opposing views espoused by these two articles ignited a vitriolic public debate among German intellectuals, pitting the conservative Nolte and a handful of colleagues against Habermas, and eventually against the majority of West German public opinion.
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In a twenty-year retrospective on the Historikerstreit published in the journal German History in 2006, Norbert Frei argued that the conflict was an intergenerational tussle initiated by those German historians born during the Weimar Republic. These men lived through the Nazi period as teenagers, "often as members of the Hitler Youth or as young soldiers." 14 Frei argued that the Historikerstreit was the product of "a generation of researchers and individuals who had a specific autobiographical agenda and were facing retirement at the start of the 1990s."
15 Thus, the Historiskerstreit reflected a wider West German generational shift that was taking place in the late 1980s as younger Germans who had never participated as soldiers or members of Hitler Youth replaced those scholars with personal memories of the War. Frei argued that the Historikerstreit was part of a "protracted political farewell" on the part of those Germans born under the Weimar Republic.
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For almost three years, fierce barbs were traded in West Germany's mainstream newspapers. Nolte's continued insistence that Hitler's antiSemitism was a rational extension of his anti-Marxism, because Marxists were supposedly Jews, and his unwillingness to distance himself from rightwing activists eager to use his arguments to exonerate Hitler, swayed the debate in favor of Habermas and those who believed it preposterous that Nazi crimes could be excused if they were reimagined as a sensible response to Stalinism. In a 1980 lecture, Nolte said: "It is hard to deny that Hitler had good reason to be convinced of his enemies' determination to annihilate long before the first information about the events in Auschwitz became public. . . . [ Because in a period in which, as you might imagine, mass murder and mass suffering are absolutely universal, the chance of a new world being born in great suffering would still have been worth backing. . . . The sacrifices were enormous; they were excessive by almost any standard and excessively great. But I'm looking back at it now and I'm saying that because it turns out that the Soviet Union was not the beginning of the world revolution. Had it been, I'm not sure.
IGNATIEFF: What that comes down to is saying that had the radiant tomorrow actually been created, the loss of fifteen, twenty million people might have been justified? HOBSBAWM: Yes.
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Hobsbawm's personal commitment to the communist ideal initially prevented the book's translation into French. Even as the book was being read in German, Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Russian, and almost every language of the former Eastern Bloc, not a single French publisher-not even Fayard, the publisher of Hobsbawm's trilogy on the nineteenth century-was willing to invest in the book. Given the book's commercial success outside of France, it was clear that the French publishing establishment was effectively censoring Hobsbawm. Writing for Lingua Franca in November 1997, Adam Shatz argued that there were three trends that prevented the translation of Hobsbawm's book: "the growth of a vituperative anti-Marxism among French intellectuals; a budget squeeze in humanities publishing; and, not least, a publishing community either unwilling or afraid to defy these trends." In January 1997, in an introduction to a 100-page symposium in the French journal, Le Débat, 24 Pierre Nora-the founding editor of Le Débat and the editor of France's most distinguished history series at Éditions Gallimard-justified his refusal to publish a translation of The Age of Extremes 25 by citing budgetary constraints and the shrinking proportion of the French population interested in scholarly history books. The length of The Age of Extremes (627 pages in English) rendered the cost of translation prohibitive, and Nora argued that his press would surely lose money on such an undertaking. But Nora also admitted to having some ideological reservations about the book. In his introduction to the symposium, Nora argued that France was "the longest and most deeply Stalinised country" in Europe and that Hobsbawm's book appeared at a moment when French public culture was just shaking off its attachment to communist idealism.
26 This "decompression" followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and "accentuated hostility to anything that could from near or far recall that former pro-Soviet, pro-communist age, including plain Marxism. Eric Hobsbawn cultivates this attachment to the revolutionary cause, even if at a distance, as a point of pride. . . . But in France at this moment, it goes down badly. "
27 Nora continued by saying that all publishers " . . . whether they want to or not, are obliged to take into account the intellectual and ideological circumstances in which they publish. There are serious reasons to think . . . that [Hobsbawm's] book would appear in an unfavourable intellectual and historical climate. "
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Part of the problem was that The Age of Extremes was published just before François Furet's highly successful Le Passé d'une illusion, a book that asserted that Nazism and communism were the twin scourges of the twentieth century. 29 Furet's book was more in line with the reigning intellectual fashion in Paris, and French publishers perhaps feared that Hobsbawm's tome would not find an audience. Furet dedicated an extended footnote to Ernst Nolte's work, blaming the communist illusion for producing a romanticized culture of anti-fascism among European intellectuals. According to Furet, this led to a misreading of the Spanish Civil War and prevented the acknowledgment of the fundamental similarities between fascism and communism.
Furet's Le Passé d'une illusion itself was the subject of an extended symposium in Le Débat. There, none other than Ernst Nolte himself contributed an essay supporting Furet's indictment of communism and its equivalence with Nazism. 30 There were important differences in the positions of Nolte and Furet. Still, the success of Le Passé d'une illusion in Germany led to a partial rehabilitation of Nolte's views. In a series of letters later exchanged between the two historians, 31 Nolte acknowledged that Furet's book had helped the international historical community to see the legitimacy of his approach "despite a number of individual differences of opinion."
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The ongoing refusal to translate The Age of Extremes was further buttressed by the political storm unleashed in France after the 1997 publication of Le Livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, répression by Éditions Robert Laffont. This tome-over eight hundred pages-was a collection of essays attempting to produce a worldwide tally of communist victims. Furet had initially been tapped to write the introduction to the book, but after his death in July 1997, the task fell to the editor Stéphane Courtois who asserted that there were 100 million worldwide victims of communism, a number four times that of the victims of Nazism. Courtois inveighed against all twentieth century communist leaders, and argued that the "single-minded focus on the Jewish genocide" had impeded the accounting of communist crimes. 33 Given the revelations contained in newly opened Soviet and East European archives, Courtois argued that Le Livre noir du communisme definitively exposed the criminal nature of all communist regimes, and claimed that all Western intellectuals who supported communist ideals were no better than "common prostitutes." 34 Almost immediately after the book's publication, however, two of the prominent historians contributing to the volume, Jean-Louis Margolin and Nicolas Werth, attacked Stéphane Courtois in an article published in Le Monde, stating that they disagreed with his vitriolic introduction and its overt political agenda.
35 Margolin and Werth disavowed the book, claiming that Courtois was obsessed with reaching a figure of one hundred million, and that this led to sloppy and biased scholarship. They further claimed that Courtois wrote the book's introduction in secret, refusing to circulate it to the other contributors. They rejected Courtois's equation of Nazism and communism, with Werth telling Le Monde that "death camps did not exist in the Soviet Union."
36 Indeed, in a 2000 review of The Passing of an Illusion and The Black Book of Communism, the Soviet historian J Arch. Getty pointed out that over half of the 100 million deaths attributed to communism were "excess deaths" resulting from famine. Getty writes: "The overwhelming weight of opinion among scholars working in the new archives (including Courtois's co-editor Werth) is that the terrible famine of the 1930s was the result of Stalinist bungling and rigidity rather than some genocidal plan. Are deaths from a famine cause by the stupidity and incompetence of a regime . . . to be equated with the deliberate gassing of Jews?" 
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In the remainder of this essay, I will turn to an ethnographic case study of Bulgaria, the country that I know the best and where I have been doing research for the better part of twenty years. By examining the case of one postcommunist East European country, especially a former Nazi ally, I wish to demonstrate how the double genocide discourse operates at the local level-both to exculpate Bulgarians for their complicity in the death of the Thracian and Macedonian Jewish populations and to undermine and discredit contemporary left-inspired political alternatives to global capitalism.
Bulgaria and World War II
In order to understand how the historical memory of communism is linked to contemporary politics, it is necessary to review briefly Bulgaria's World War II history, even while recognizing that this history is still contested.
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There are few completely uncontroversial facts that one can assert about Bulgaria during the Second World War; for the purposes of simplicity, I will just sketch a broad outline based on what non-Bulgarian scholars have written. 52 What is incontrovertible is that Bulgaria was an Axis ally during World War II. Although Nazi troops were allowed to pass through Bulgaria on their way to Greece, Bulgaria was under full control of the Bulgarian Royal Army. King Boris III made this allegiance with the hope of regaining lost Bulgarian territories in the Balkans. The Bulgarians occupied large parts of Northern Greece and Vardar Macedonia, which remained under their administration until September 9, 1944 when Bulgarian communists overthrew the monarchy, through a revolution or a coup d'état, depending on whom you ask.
In November 1940, the Bulgarian government under Prime Minister Bogdan Filov proposed legislation entitled the "Law for the Protection of the Nation," which included a variety of harsh measures directed against Bulgaria's Jewish population. The Bulgarian National Assembly voted to enact this law one month later. 53 Thus, even before Bulgaria was officially allied with Germany, Bulgaria's political elite voted to deprive Bulgarian Jews of their civil rights. 54 The law established a Commissariat for Jewish Affairs, which was charged with overseeing the enforcement of all laws pertaining to the Jewish population, including restrictions on where Jews could live, forced name changes, exclusion from public service, confiscation of their property, and other restrictions on their economic and professional activities. In response, the Bulgarian Communist Party mobilized a massive action to popularize the Soviet proposal. They circulated petitions and collected signatures in the hope of using democratic pressure to force the Bulgarian government to reverse its decision. It is estimated that between 350,000 and 500,000 Bulgarians signed the petition, an impressive result for a poor country with little communications infrastructure and a population of only 5.2 million.
57 Despite the number of signatures collected, the Bulgarian government, fearing a Bolshevik-style revolution, rejected the proposal. Three months after the Sobolev action, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov signed the Tripartite Pact. On March 1, 1941 Bulgaria officially entered the war on the side of the Axis Powers.
A year later, Bulgarian soldiers helped German officials deport 11,459 Jews from Bulgarian-occupied Greece and Macedonia. 58 In reaction to the deportation of the Greek and Macedonian Jews, the ranks of Bulgaria's communist-led partisan movement swelled.
59 According to the historian Frederick Chary, there were about four hundred Jewish partisans out of ten thousand active resistance fighters, a membership rate that was "four times greater than the population as a whole." 60 The Bulgarian government of Bogdan Filov used this fact to justify its anti-Semitic and anti-communist policies.
61 As the rebel numbers grew, the Bulgarian government responded by further increasing its efforts to stamp out the guerilla threat. The government created a special gendarmerie force with almost unlimited power to hunt down and persecute partisans and their civilian helpers.
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The partisans were scattered and disorganized. Still, the Bulgarian government blamed them for acts of sabotage against German supply lines and for targeted political assassinations. A man named General Hristo Lu- 
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Although the killers escaped, the Bulgarian government blamed the murder on a nineteen-year-old girl-a Jewish, communist partisan-and used the assassination as an excuse to step up their persecution of the resistance movement. 65 In his diary, Prime Minister Bogdan Filov recounts a conversation with the current Minister of Interior, Petar Gabrovski, in which they decided to "begin a newspaper campaign against the Communists and the Jews, while tightening repressive measures against them."
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Tensions rose again on May 23, when the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs issued orders for the immediate deportation of the roughly 25,000 Bulgarian Jews living in Sofia. 67 Sofia's Jews were given only three days to depart from the capital, taking with them only what they could carry.
68 Men were expected to report to Sofia train station with their families and a complete inventory of their personal effects, leaving their homes and businesses behind. Officially, the government wanted to resettle the Jews in smaller towns in the Bulgarian provinces, but at the time many believed understandably that the deportation to the provinces represented a first step in their ultimate deportation to Treblinka. A July 1943 article in the Worker's Cause, an underground newspaper of the Bulgarian communists, attempted to rally other citizens to action:
It is the patriotic duty of every Bulgarian to unite in a powerful campaign in defence of the Jews, which will embrace all democratic and patriotic forces in this country and prevent the materialization of the intentions of the king, the government, and the remaining agents of Hitler in this country. . . . We warn you that the problem of the deportation of the Jews from the country is not precluded. The government was obliged to put it off for the time being, but, under favorable circumstances, it will try to fulfill its criminal intentions. The latter can be prevented only with a consistent, bold, and persistent struggle. . . . With joint efforts and decisive actions, the fascist beast will be crushed.
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If Bulgarians heeded this call, they put themselves in grave personal danger. Anyone caught aiding the resistance could be arrested and summarily executed. 70 The gendarmes and the local police also took to burning the family homes of known partisan fighters. In addition, the gendarmes committed many atrocities: gang rapes, decapitations, and bodily mutilations. pikes in village squares as a warning to those whose sympathies lay with the resistance. People were frightened into submission by the sheer brutality of the Bulgarian government's reprisals. 72 Ultimately, the Bulgarian government did manage to save its own Jewish population from deportation, and this is a fact proudly remembered every year since 2011 on a day set aside for the commemoration of the victims of Bulgarian communism.
Bulgaria's Victims of Communism
On 
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To increase accessibility to the monument, a virtual monument was also constructed in 2009. In addition, the American Research Center in Sofia launched a website-victimsofcommunism.bg-for the twentieth anniversary in 1989. 75 The website includes over 17,000 names of people said to be victims of communism, and it warns Bulgarians never to forget the evils of their communist past. The description on the project's homepage clearly echoed Nolte's idea of the two totalitarianisms: "The 20th century created two monsters: nazism [sic] and communism. While no educated, humane, and democratically minded person today would defend nazism, many still justify communism, a regime responsible for the death of over 100 million people worldwide. In 1944, communism was forcefully introduced in Bulgaria. Terror followed overnight and lasted a very long time. Thousands were murdered or sent to prisons and concentration camps for being wealthy, educated, skilled, politically 'dangerous' or for no pretext whatsoever."
76 Apparently, the innocent blood shed "for no pretext whatsoever" continues to haunt Bulgaria's political elites today. In 2009, a new government commissioned yet another physical monument to the victims of communism. In her emotional speech on February 1, 2013, Vice President Margarita Popova declared: "No one has the right to falsify history or to rewrite it, and no one can take away the memories of the people whose relatives were massacred. "
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Of course, there were innocent victims of the communist regime in Bulgaria, sent to labor camps by paranoid dictators. But it is important to remember that the specific date chosen for the Day of Homage and Gratitude-February 1-marks the death sentences in 1945 of 147 members of the Bulgarian WWII government. One English language daily in Bulgaria reported that those murdered by the communists included: "the three regents during the time of then-boy king Simeon II, 22 former cabinet ministers, eight royal advisers, 67 members of parliament and 47 generals and senior officers, including the commanders of all armed forces. . . . At the hands of the communist 'People's Court,' Bulgaria's former political and military elite was liquidated at a single stroke."
78 Sending the story out on the newswire, the Associated Press reported that some Bulgarians laid wreaths at the foot of a wall inscribed with the names of many who died at the hands of the communists: "The victims memorialized on the wall include many political opponents of communism executed after September 1944, when Bulgaria's communists seized power in this tiny Balkan country."
79 Around the world the AP story was published and republished on news websites under the headline, "Bulgaria honors victims of communism. " None of these articles mentions Bulgaria's World War II alliance with Hitler, nor is there any discussion of who is included among these 147 members of the country's political and military elite.
The double genocide narrative works to exonerate the deeds of known fascists and make "victims" of men openly allied with the Third Reich. These victims of communism include major military and political figures who worked closely with Nazi Germany. Bogdan Filov was the Bulgarian prime minister from 1940 to 1943.
80 His government passed the 1940 Law for the Protection of the Nation, and set up the Commissariat for Jewish Affairs. Although Filov yielded to local pressure to save Bulgaria's own Jewish population, it was his government that decided that roughly eleven thousand men, women, and children in the annexed territories in Macedonia and Greece would be deported to the death camps in Treblinka. Another listed victim of communism in Bulgaria was General Nikola Zhekov, a personal friend of Adolf Hitler, 85 and the head of the Bulgarian far-right Legionnaires.
86 After the Red Army entered Bulgaria in September 1944, Zhekov fled Bulgaria fearing political persecution by the new communist regime. He was already in Germany when the People's Court sentenced him to death on February 1, 1945 . He died in Bavaria in 1949 at the age of 84, far from any Bulgarian firing squad. Since his name appears on the list of the "political and military elite" who were found guilty of collaboration with the government of Bogdan Filov, however, he is still celebrated as a "victim of communism."
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An extreme case was General Hristo Lukov, the nationalist supposedly assassinated by a nineteen-year-old Jewish partisan. 88 Although the government blamed Lukov's 1943 death on the communists, Lukov was dead well before the People's Courts ever had a chance to execute him by firing squad.
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He served as the Bulgarian Minister of War and an extreme right-wing politician who led the Union of Bulgarian National Legions-the Legionnaires. Lukov called for the racial and ethnic purity of the Bulgarian people during the First and Second World Wars. In 2013, he was still a beacon for neo-Nazi sympathizers in Bulgaria. 90 In fact, in 2011, the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) issued a press release asking the mayor of Sofia to ban an impending Lukov March.
The letter protested the annual permit granted to this march, which was organized by a coalition of nationalist forces in the name of Hristo Lukov. The letter states: "The Lukov March is the most important public event of [right-wing] groups in Bulgarian society, which have showed open or covert adherence to fascist, neo-Nazi and ultra national-populist ideas.
[The] Lukov March is especially dangerous for its impact on young people, promoting authoritarian and anti-democratic ideas under the guise of patriotism and reverence for the national war heroes. "
91 A European NGO against racism can protest against marches held in Lukov's name, but in Bulgaria he is listed as an innocent victim of communism. About men such as these, the Victims of Communism memorial monument tells us: "Lord, give peace to the souls of your martyrs, grant them your justice. Accept them as our guardians, holy and immortal-now and forever. Amen."
The February 1 memorialization is not without controversy in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Antifascist Union, 
Conclusion
Is it a coincidence that this sudden surge of concern with commemorating the victims of communism appeared in the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2008? As markets plunged and the Eurozone economies teetered on the edge of collapse, the European Parliament passed the resolution establishing the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism. Bulgaria's economy had also been devastated by the crisis, and popular faith in democracy and capitalism had evaporated. In this context it became necessary to honor and pay gratitude to all victims of communism, no matter who they were or what they did as staunch allies of Hitler. According to the Prague Declaration and its double genocide narrative, class murder and race murder are moral equivalents. The European Union's uncritical embrace of this double genocide ideology seems designed to protect the interests of the political and economic elites in both Western and Eastern Europe. Just when neoliberal capitalism is facing devastated economies and extreme inequalities of wealth, European leaders gravitate toward an intellectual paradigm in which: 1) any move towards redistribution and away from a completely free market is seen as communist; 2) anything communist inevitably leads to class murder; and 3) class murder is the moral equivalent of the Holocaust. Although the European Union's leaders may not be intentionally cultivating the discourse, their support of the double genocide thesis has a real impact on the nature of public debate. Any challenge to unfettered capitalism-whether in the form of protests in Greece and Spain or Obamacare in the United States-can be painted as the moral equivalent of Auschwitz even as, ironically, European popular discourses also blame "Jewish" financial interests in the United States for creating the crisis in the first place.
This narrative is already impacting the future of Europe. Across the continent today, right-wing parties are once again on the rise, and they are finding mass support from populations weary of the increasing presence of Middle Eastern, South Asian, or African immigrants. Non-European and ethnic minority populations can become an easy scapegoat in times of economic austerity; across Europe there is rising anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, and anti-Roma violence. As the German government, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund move to dismantle welfare states in Europe's periphery for the sake of stabilizing global financial markets, an increasing number of Greeks, Spaniards, Bulgarians, Romanians, Portuguese, and Ukrainians find themselves drawn to the far right. Since the evils of communism are, according to the narrative, so incredibly grave, one need not worry too much about fascist elements, so long as they are opposing communism. On the double genocide story, even the extremes of fascism are no worse than the "inevitable" outcome of steps towards socialism; if they are morally equivalent, then the political and economic elite do no wrong by choosing the pole that accords with their own financial interests.
As I write this, a particularly potent lingering effect of the Historikerstreit may be emerging in Ukraine. As of March 8, 2014 , the Russians are in the Crimea, and American pundits are warning that there is a new Cold War looming. The United States has unequivocally backed a new Ukrainian government that contains unsavory right-wing elements. 93 Careful observers have tried to call attention to the role that the far-right, anti-Semitic party, Svoboda [Freedom] , played in the Maidan protests and in creating the political instability in Ukraine. 94 Members of the nationalist Svoboda party have taken up key posts in the interim government after the ouster of pro-Russian President Yanukovych. At the same time, the right-wing media and blogosphere in the United States are painting Putin's Russia as communist. This theme has been taken up by Marion Smith, the new director of the U.S. Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, one of the only two American member organizations of the European Platform for Memory and Conscience, and a conservative proponent of the double genocide. In a March 5, 2014 article in the Washington Examiner, Smith was quoted as saying: "I consider it a sacred responsibility to keep alive the memory of 100 million people who were killed by Communist regimes since 1917. Unfortunately, recent events in Ukraine-the reprise of Soviet-style rhetoric, and a rise of pro-Communist sentiments among segments of the population-have highlighted the difficulty of overcoming the legacy of Soviet communism. The work of our foundation is needed more than ever."
95
Over at foxnews.com, a resident national security analyst likewise sees Russia as promoting communism, writing that "Putin claims the greatest tragedy of the 20th century was the breakup of the Soviet Union. He studied the causes and planned the comeback."
96 Pundits at the National Review claim that the Russian aggression in Ukraine is a harbinger of "National Bolshevism." 97 At Forbes, Roger Scruton authored an article entitled: "To Understand Ukraine, We Must Remember The Communist Past."
98 In it he asserted: "Few of the current generation of West European politicians have had to wrestle with the inner nature of the Soviet Union, or to explore the deep psychology of those like Vladimir Putin and his circle, who were formed as secret police officers under communism."
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If Russia's actions in Crimea are seen as steps toward the second coming of communism, then this will certainly affect foreign policy moves by the West, especially as the Western nations sort through their options in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and the larger Russian threat to Ukraine and perhaps other former Soviet Republics. If right-wing pundits can convince the American public that Putin is a communist, then the double genocide version of history would mandate that we oppose him with the same vigor as we would someone advocating another Holocaust. Although both Congress and the American public were wary of engaging with Russia over Crimea, Fox News and the right wing blogosphere attacked Obama for his "weakness" in not standing up to Putin. A hypothesis that was deemed a dangerous fringe view in Germany in the 1980s, and was continuously challenged by scholars throughout the 1990s, has gained increasing traction in the United States and may end up influencing American foreign policy.
As Ukraine erupts into civil violence, it is only a matter of time before the West faces the stark choice between supporting the far right or the far left in countries destabilized by the global financial crisis such as Greece where the immigrant-friendly, anti-austerity, left-wing SYRIZA coalition is opposed by the neo-fascist Golden Dawn party. If both sides of this spectrum are equally evil, then there will be no moral qualm in choosing the side more likely to serve Western political and economic interests, even if this means the institutionalization of a new nationalist xenophobia. If communism and fascism are moral equivalents, threats to the private property of the superrich or political acts that will destabilize global markets are the moral equivalents of the systematic murder of immigrants and internal others. The double genocide thesis and its production of the "victims of communism" discourse not only aims to prevent a return of leftist politics. It can also be used to justify acceptance of neo-fascism. 
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